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The Member States of the European Union (EU) have been engaged in highly divisive 
debates about whether and how to reform the rules for the ‘free movement’ of EU workers 
and their access to national welfare states. While some countries have argued for new 
restrictions on EU workers’ access to welfare benefits, many others have opposed policy 
change. What explains EU Member States’ different policy positions on this issue? Existing 
accounts have focused on populist political parties and the media. In contrast, this article 
provides a theoretical institutional analysis of how cross-country differences in the regulation 
of national labour markets and welfare states can contribute to divergent national policy 
responses to free movement. We argue and explain how labour market and welfare state 
institutions can affect national policy actors’ positions on free movement directly, and/or 








‘Free movement’ for workers is one of the fundamental freedoms of the European Union 
(EU). In recent years it has been subject to highly divisive political debates. At the centre of 
the debate are the current rules for this freedom, according to which EU citizens can move 
and take up employment in any other EU country and – as long as they are ’workers’ – enjoy 
full and equal access to the host country’s welfare state. The debate about introducing 
restrictions on the cross-border mobility of EU workers itself appears to have been limited to 
the UK. In an op-ed for the Financial Times in late 2013, entitled ’Free movement within 
Europe needs to be less free’, David Cameron, the British Prime Minister at the time, 
suggested a cap on EU immigration.1 However, the political leadership in a number of 
Member States, most notably in the UK2 but also in Denmark, Netherlands and Austria, has 
called for more restricted access for EU workers to welfare benefits. Denmark’s Prime 
Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen indicated in early February 2016 that he would support UK 
efforts to reduce EU migrants’ access to welfare benefits.3 The Dutch Deputy Prime Minister, 
Lodewijk Asscher, recently argued for reform of free movement.4 In 2016, Austria’s Foreign 
Minister, Sebastian Kurz, suggested that EU migrants’ access to (non-contributory) low 
income support should be restricted for a period of five years.5 The Austrian centre-right 
government elected in late 2017 recently announced that it would reduce child benefits for 
EU workers whose children live abroad in lower-income countries of the EU.6 Most other EU 
countries have been opposed to fundamental and permanent reform, insisting that the current 
policy of unrestricted access to labour markets and full and equal access to welfare states for 
EU workers must continue. 
What explains EU Member States’ different policy positions on reforming the current 
rules for the free movement of workers and their access to welfare benefits? There are some 




States in Eastern Europe (i.e. the countries that have joined the EU since 2004) which are 
primarily sending countries, defined here as countries of net-emigration. While there might 
be some concerns about free movement as such due to fears of ‘brain drain’, the political 
leaders of these countries also have good reasons for trying to maintain their citizens’ 
unrestricted access to the labour markets of richer EU countries in order to boost remittances, 
and for defending the social rights of their ’mobile workers’ and family members, who are all 
potential voters. Among the older Member States (i.e. the ’EU-15’ countries that were 
members of the EU before 2004), calls for reforming free movement have often been 
attributed, at least in part, to a range of actors including populist political parties (e.g. Policy 
Network 2017; Mortera-Martinez and Odendahl 2017) and the media which, it is commonly 
argued, have been playing on populistic emotions and influencing the public’s perceptions 
about the scale and effects of free movement (e.g. Moore and Ramsay 2017; Blauberger et. 
al., 2018)  
Notwithstanding the relevance and influence of these factors, this article addresses a 
much more complicated but potentially important question, namely, the role and effects of 
differences between the national institutions of EU Member States. We provide a theoretical 
analysis of the potential tensions between cross-country variations in national welfare state 
institutions and the regulation of national labour markets, on the one hand, and common EU 
regulations for the free movement of EU workers and their access to welfare rights, on the 
other hand. We explore how the characteristics of national labour market and welfare state 
institutions can affect the development of national policy positions on free movement 
directly, and/or indirectly via inter-relationships with normative attitudes and the 
characteristics (including the scale, composition and effects) of the inflows of EU workers. 




inflows of mobile workers in recent years and where disagreements about the need to reform 
free movement have been voiced.  
The paper proceeds in three steps. We begin with a brief discussion of the theoretical 
motivations and starting points of our analysis. The core of the paper then provides a 
discussion of why and how variations in national welfare states, labour markets and related 
normative attitudes may contribute to divergent national policy positions on free movement 
among EU member states. We conclude our theoretical analysis with a set of hypotheses 
about the potential links between national institutions and national policy positions on the 
current rules for free movement. Overall, the article aims to provide a theoretical basis for 
what we consider to be an important new agenda for empirical research on the role of 
national institutions in political conflicts around free movement in the EU.  
 
Explaining political conflicts around free movement: A new research agenda 
Free movement is a fundamental aspect of European integration. It was first set out as a 
major goal of the European Community in the Treaty of Rome (1957) and fully implemented 
in 1968 when EU Council Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 68/30 removed restrictions on 
the movement of Community workers and their families. The right to free movement has also 
been a cornerstone of ’EU citizenship’ which was established by the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992. Free movement means that any EU citizen is entitled to move and freely take up 
employment in any other EU country. The beneficiaries of this freedom primarily include 
jobseekers, i.e. EU citizens who move to another EU country to look for a job. For 
economically inactive groups (such as retirees), the right to free movement and residence 
within the EU is conditional on health insurance and sufficient resources such that they will 




However, family members of EU nationals working in another EU country are entitled to 
reside and work in that country.  
In terms of access to the welfare state, the right to equal treatment for EU citizens 
living in another EU member state depends on whether they are economically active or not, 
the extent of integration in the host country and the type of the benefit claimed (Costello and 
Hancox 2014). For EU citizens who move to another EU country for the purpose of 
employment, access to the welfare state critically depends on having the legal status of a 
‘worker’. To be considered a worker by EU law, a person must pursue ‘effective’ and 
‘genuine’ economic activity. EU workers are entitled to equal access to all social rights 
granted to nationals of the host country.  
Existing research has covered a wide range of aspects of free movement in the 
European Union, including, for example: its origins and functions in the larger project of 
European integration and EU citizenship (Maas 2014); its role in the domestic politics of 
immigration of particular member states (e.g. Bucken-Knapp 2009); legal challenges to the 
rules of free movement (e.g. Peers 2015); the lived experiences of mobile workers (Recchi 
2015) including the effects of national administrative processes on the exercise of free 
movement rights in practice (Bruzelius 2018; Kramer et. al. 2018) and the impacts of 
mobility on identities (e.g. Favell 2009); the determinants of the scale of intra-EU mobility 
(e.g. Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016); and its effects on labour markets (e.g. Migration 
Advisory Committee 2012) and welfare states (e.g. Martinsen and Rotger 2017; Nyman and 
Ahlskog 2018).  
In contrast, there has been little to no academic research, to the best of our knowledge, 
on the sources of the current political conflicts around free movement between EU member 
states, and especially on the potential role of national institutional factors. While there were 




and full implementation of free movement for workers during the 1950s and 1960s (see Maas 
2005), once fully established the principle of free movement was remarkably stable and 
largely unchallenged by individual EU member states until the early 2000s. Political conflicts 
between EU member states around the fundamental rules for free movement only emerged 
after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, which led to considerable increases of intra-EU 
labour mobility, and the economic crisis that began in 2008, which caused wide-spread 
concerns about alleged adverse impacts of immigration on the labour markets and welfare 
states of the EU-15 countries. These conflicts became most visible during and after Britain’s 
failed attempt in 2016 (around the time of the UK’s referendum on continued EU 
membership) to convince the rest of the EU to reform free movement, or to recognize the UK 
as a ‘special case’ that requires different mobility policies (see Ruhs 2017). By analyzing the 
potential role of national institutions as sources of these conflicts, our article contributes to an 
important new research agenda that fills what has recently emerged as an important gap in the 
large existing research literature on free movement in the European Union.  
 
Theoretical motivations and starting points  
Our analysis is informed by three different strands of research. First, there is a long-standing 
research literature that investigates the relationship between immigration and welfare states. 
Freeman argued that large-scale immigration challenges the fiscal and political stability of 
the welfare state, concluding that ‘…the relatively free movement of labor across national 
frontiers exposes the tension between closed welfare states and open economies and that, 
ultimately, national welfare states cannot coexist with the free movement of labor.’ (Freeman 
1986: 51). A related but yet distinct argument is that increased immigration and diversity can 
undermine solidarity and public support for the welfare state and social policies more 




mixed (e.g. Brady and Finnigan 2014) and it is clear that public attitudes toward the welfare 
states are influenced by a wide range of factors that have little to do with immigration. 
However, research suggests that the nature of social and other rights for migrants can affect 
public support for more open admission policies (Hanson et al. 2007). 
As free movement combines unrestricted intra-EU migration and equal access to 
national welfare states it clearly challenges theories and claims about the alleged 
incompatibility of open borders and inclusive welfare states. Geddes and Hadj-Abdou (2015) 
argue that the current rules for free movement might constitute an unstable equilibrium. As 
the scale of intra-EU mobility has increased considerably since the early 2000s, it is 
important to ask and explore whether and why the recent political conflicts around free 
movement have been influenced by the emergence of tensions between in-ward mobility and 
the national welfare state in some member states but not in others.  
 A second theoretical motivation and starting point for this article is the more recent 
research literature in comparative political economy on how national institutions can be 
related to and influence immigration and immigration policies (for theoretical discussions 
see, e.g., Afonso and Devitt 2016; Cerna 2009). For example, Ruhs (2018) finds that liberal 
market economies (LMEs) with liberal welfare states are less likely to require self-
sufficiency as a criterion of admission but more likely to restrict migrants’ social rights after 
admission than coordinated market economies with other types of welfare states. The same 
study finds that LMEs are also more likely to be characterised by trade-offs between the 
openness of admission policies and the social rights migrants are granted after admission. In a 
different empirical study of openness to labour immigration and forced migrants in OECD 
countries, Boräng (2018) finds that the nature of the national labour market is related to the 
scale of labour immigration and the nature of the welfare states influences the inflows of 




results, it clearly suggests that that the character of the welfare state may have consequences 
for national policy positions on free movement in some kind of interplay with the labour 
market regime. 
A third analytical starting point for our article is the tension between European 
integration, especially via a common legal framework, and certain types of socio-economic 
regimes and institutions at the national level. Scharpf (2010: 233) suggests that ‘…EU 
member states differ greatly in the institutional structures and normative premises of their 
existing economic and social systems, and that the specific national configurations have high 
political salience and may, indeed, be considered as part of the constitutional identity of EU 
member states’. He argues that what he calls European ‘integration through law’ has a 
liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socio-economic regimes (including the welfare 
regimes) of EU member states which makes it more compatible with liberal market 
economies than with coordinated market economies. Scharpf (2010) makes a convincing case 
for studying whether and how specific national institutions can come into conflict with 
common EU policies and legal frameworks, such as free movement. 
 
National institutions and political conflicts around free movement 
Our starting point is that the processes for developing national policy positions and responses 
to free movement can be expected to include a degree of rationality, in the sense that they are 
likely to be shaped by the actual interests of different actors and effects of institutions, but we 
also allow for normative attitudes and ideas to shape interests and institutions in particular 
ways.  
We are trying to explain the national policy response to free movement. More 
specifically our focus is on whether or not a particular EU member state has an explicit 




preferences for reform could, in principle, include calls to restrict EU workers’ access to the 
national labour market (i.e. restrict labour mobility itself), the national welfare state, or both. 
As mentioned in the introduction, in practice the UK has been the only country – so far – that 
suggested restrictions on free labour mobility itself.7  
We concentrate on two key national institutions, namely, labour markets and welfare 
states. These two institutions constitute core aspects of free movement and have been at the 
centre of recent debates about policy reform. We hypothesise that national labour markets 
and welfare states can affect policy responses to free movement directly as well as indirectly 
via interactions with ’normative attitudes’ (see below) and with the actual scale, 
characteristics and effects of ’mobility’ (labour migration within the EU).  
Institutions, normative attitudes, and mobility impact on policy by providing the 
context for national policy actors when they respond to issues related to free movement. 
While the national policy position of a particular country on reforming free movement is 
critically dependent on how political parties, interest groups and civil society think and 
interact, the focus in this article is on the institutional context within which these actors are 
embedded.  
Our analysis considers both formal and informal institutions (Streeck and Thelen 
2005). Formal institutions here refer to rules and regulations that have been decided at either 
the national or EU level. Informal institutions are not anchored in legislation but in people’s 
values and norms. Formal institutions (e.g. welfare states) can be expected to affect informal 
institutions (e.g. views about the deservingness of welfare recipients or the appropriateness of 
a particular welfare institution) but they are not the same. We focus on normative attitudes as 
informal institutions. By putting ‘normative’ in front of ‘attitude’ we indicate that the attitude 
is anchored in values and ideas about how things ought to be. In our approach, normative 




formal institutions. We expect normative attitudes to vary across countries and to be 
influenced by the existing national institutions.  
The key normative attitudes of interest to our analysis are attitudes about how the 
welfare state, labour market institutions and EU Regulations should be organised. The 
assumption is that populations in the different member states will be influenced by their 
national welfare state and labour market institutions, so that they will develop specific norms 
of what constitutes an ’appropriate’ institutional design and hence be inclined to support 
supra-national institutions that follow the same logic as their national institutions (cf. 
Thornton et al. 2012). This is anchored in the observation that welfare state and labour 
market institutions exhibit strong path dependency, which suggests that the logic of formal 
institutions has become embedded also in informal institutions (normative attitudes). This 
starting point of our analytical approach is informed by Lepsius’ (2017) work on 
democratization, which can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of welfare state institutions. 
Institutions may embody both (rational) interests and value based elements, and different 
interests and ideas may have made imprints on the same set of institutions. People may not 
immediately share the norms that are embedded in a new institution but over time formal 
institutions foster what in our conceptual framework are called normative attitudes that are in 
accordance with the formal institutions. This dynamic process, which Lepsius called 
institutionalization, helps us understand how formal institutions may influence normative 
attitudes, which in turn become important mechanisms for sustaining these institutions but at 
the same time may come into conflict with other kinds of formal institutions (such as EU 
regulations). 
With this conceptual framework, the remainder of the article discusses why and how 
cross-country variations in national labour markets, welfare states, and related normative 




member states. In addition to considering the material effects of different types of labour 
market and welfare systems, we emphasise and explain why the normative attitudes 
associated with particular national institutions are likely to become an important part of the 




Labour markets, labour market regulations and other institutions surrounding human capital 
formation, such as education systems, vary considerably across countries. The multi-
dimensionality and complexity of these institutions make it hard to draw clear analytical lines 
between different institutional models. The ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (VoC) literature makes 
a broad distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies (LMEs and CMEs, 
respectively) based on whether key spheres or production, especially the relations between 
firms and other actors in the economy, are coordinated primarily by market or non-market 
mechanisms (see, for example, Hall and Soskice 2001). CMEs are characterized by relatively 
cooperative industrial relations, regulated labour markets with a high degree of coordinated 
wage bargaining, and education and skills formation policies that aim to provide industry-
specific rather than general skills, partly via a strong emphasis on vocational training 
systems. In contrast, LMEs are more likely to have weakly regulated and thus more flexible 
labour markets (with fewer employment rights and protections for workers), less wage 
bargaining (especially at industry level), and education and training systems that are aimed at 
providing general rather than industry-specific skills. Liberal market economies tend to have 
larger low-wage labour markets than coordinated market economies, with few exceptions.. It 
is important to add that there can be important variations within these broad categories. For 




coordinated market economies. Coordination among countries in Northern Europe relies less 
on legislation and more on trade-union and employer activism than is the case in many other 
coordinated economies in continental Europe.  
We can expect important inter-relationships between the national labour market and 
associated socio-economic institutions on the one hand, and the scale, composition and 
effects of in-ward mobility of EU workers on the other hand. In the absence of restrictive 
labour immigration policies that regulate the number and types of migrants admitted, one of 
the key drivers of the scale and composition of inward-mobility of EU workers is employer 
demand for mobile (migrant) labour. Employer demand for migrant labour is critically 
influenced by the institutional and regulatory framework of the labour market as well as 
wider public policies such as education and training policies, welfare policies, housing 
policies, etc. (Anderson and Ruhs 2010). Compared to coordinated market economies with 
relatively regulated labour markets, liberal market economies with flexible labour markets 
and relatively large low-wage labour markets can be expected to generate greater employer 
demand for migrants, especially but not only for employment in low-waged jobs (see e.g. 
Devitt 2011; Wright 2012).  
 By influencing the scale and skill composition of inward mobility, national labour 
market institutions also shape the real and perceived effects of the employment of EU 
workers on the domestic economy and society. For example, compared to coordinated 
economies with regulated labour markets, the relatively larger inflows of lower-skilled 
mobile (migrant) workers into liberal market economies with flexible labour markets mean 
that the short-term wage and employment effects of immigration in these economies will be 
more concentrated toward the low-wage end of the national labour market. The existing 




small effects on average but potentially bigger negative effects for the lowest-paid workers in 
the economy (see, for example, the review in Migration Advisory Committee 2012).  
National labour market institutions can also affect how a given magnitude and type of 
inward-mobility impacts on the national labour market, economy and society. For example, 
flexible labour markets are more likely to adjust to immigration via changes in wages rather 
than through job losses of competing domestic workers, at least in the short run (e.g. Angrist 
and Kugler 2003). More generally, in liberal market economies, immigration policy can 
become a tool of promoting the flexibility of the labour market by providing employers with 
highly mobile migrant workers who, among other things, can help maintain relatively-low 
cost productions systems. In contrast, in coordinated market economies there are likely to be 
strong pressures, partly through the stronger role of unions in shaping employment relations 
and conditions, to employ migrants at the prevailing (e.g. collectively agreed on) wage. As a 
result, in coordinated market economies inward mobility of EU workers can be expected to 
play a smaller role in lowering or moderating wage growth, at all skill levels.  
 By shaping the characteristics and labour market effects of inward mobility, national 
labour market institutions also impact on the fiscal effects of EU workers. For example, 
institutions that encourage a relatively large inflow of migrants for low-waged employment 
will naturally also lead to larger numbers of migrants in receipt of means-tested welfare 
benefits. More generally, the fiscal effects of immigration - i.e. the difference between the 
taxes migrants pay and the costs of public services and benefits that migrants consume – 
depend on three sets of factors: (i) the characteristics of migrants, especially their skills and 
age; (ii) migrants’ labour market participation, performance and impacts; and (iii) the nature 
and design of the welfare state (e.g. OECD 2013). As discussed above, national labour 





Welfare states  
The notion of ’welfare state chauvinism‘, where citizens in a country want to exclude 
migrants and other non-citizens from getting access to ’their‘ rights (Andersen and Bjorklund 
1990), is a fruitful starting point for identifying different sources of the tensions between 
migration and the welfare state. Welfare chauvinism can be related to values, i.e. to ideas and 
norms about fairness or deservingness of welfare recipients. It can also stem from self-
interest, i.e. from concerns about migrants being a burden on the tax payers. Moreover, since 
welfare state institutions constitute a nation state project per se, any EU regulations in this 
area can generate conflicts about the perceived ’appropriateness‘ of the level of the decision 
making (national or EU level).  
Theorising about the sources of political conflicts between EU member states about 
free movement and equal access for EU workers to welfare benefits requires consideration of 
the cross national differences in welfare states. Due to longstanding historical legacies as well 
as more recent reforms and retrenchments, contemporary European welfare states differ in a 
number of important respects (e.g. Palme and Ruhs 2018). The gradual expansion of the 
number of member states since the Treaty of Rome has increased the diversity of welfare 
states organisation in the EU (Palme et al. 2009). Considering the various sources of welfare 
state chauvinism, there are a number of different reasons for why this large welfare state 
variation is potentially a very important factor for explaining the divergent national policy 
positions on reforming free movement among EU member states. 
First, there is a popular and widespread view across EU member states that 
’reciprocity‘ should be a guiding principle in the provision of welfare benefits for immigrants 
(Martensson and Uba 2018), which suggests that contributory or ’merit‘ based entitlements 




based on citizenship/residence (Reeskens and Oorschot 2012). That different welfare systems 
are associated with different underlying principles of benefit provision (e.g. contribution-
based, universal and needs based) with variable degrees of (in)consistency with the idea of 
reciprocity may be an important source for political salience of the access to welfare state 
entitlements of mobile EU workers. 
Second, it should also be recognised that the current EU regulations of social rights 
for mobile workers are modelled on the Continental European welfare state regime that, by 
and large, was applied among the original member states of the European Economic 
Community. Countries that have welfare states that differ from the Continental European 
welfare state model may be more likely to want to change the rules on free movement, when 
it comes to giving mobile workers access to benefits. 
Third, the design of the welfare state is one of the determinants of the fiscal effects of 
immigration on the host country and national policy positions may be guided by a rationalist 
calculus of the costs and benefits of inward mobility. While variations in welfare states across 
countries may play a role in explaining differences in the fiscal effects, such effects are 
complicated to estimate (see Nyman and Ahlskog 2018). We can also expect that variations 
in fiscal effects across different welfare state institutions may broadly be in line with 
variations along the deservingness dimension, insofar as contributory programmes are likely 
to spill over fewer costs to the taxpayers than universal or needs-based programmes. For this 
reason, the primary focus of this article is on the ideational and normative sources of the 
tensions, rather than on cost-benefit analysis for particular interest groups. 
 There are, therefore, good reasons to identify key variations of welfare states across 
EU countries and investigate the implications of these differences for EU Member States’ 
variable policy responses to free movement. We suggest that the key differences between 




relate to the characteristics of social insurance programs, family policies, and health care as 
well as how these systems are financed. While the taxonomies that we use have certain ideal-
type features, we use them for analytical purposes as systems of classification of countries. 
 
Social insurance policies 
When it comes to identifying variations in social insurance systems it is helpful (cf. Korpi 
and Palme 1998) to clarify if benefits are (1) means tested or not, (2) flat rate or earnings-
related, and (3) segmented or universal in administration. This gives insights about the 
relative importance of the underlying principles of benefit provision and also captures 
organisational features. In Europe, no country follows the means-tested or targeted model 
that has been so important in Australasia. This does not mean that we cannot find means- or 
income-tested benefits in Europe but rather that such programs fulfil a complementary or 
supplementary role. The relative size of expenditures on means-tested programs varies across 
models/countries but it is generally smaller than spending on social insurance programs.  
Flat-rate benefits were a key feature of Beveridge’s basic security model that was 
established in the UK after World War II. Both the British and the Irish social protection 
systems follow that model. In the absence of proper earnings-related social insurance 
benefits, means- or income-tested benefits play an important supplementary role in countries 
with only basic flat-rate benefits (Palme et al. 2009).  
Segmented administration prevails in the state corporatist model, where benefits are 
administered separately for different segments/corporations in the labour market, e.g. pension 
systems and sickness insurance in countries such as France and Germany. The fact that 
benefits provided by these segmented systems tend to be earnings-related implies that they 
provide adequate income replacement and less need for supplementary benefits for those who 




who are outside the labour market or working in ’secondary‘ labour markets not covered by 
compulsory insurance typically required by segmented systems. 
In contrast, in universal administrative frameworks that provide earnings-related 
benefits known as the encompassing model (applied among the Nordic countries), the needs 
for supplementary means- or income-tested benefits are expected to be lower than in all the 
other models (targeted, basic security and state corporatist), also because the model typically 
include universal basic components such as universal basic pensions and universal child 
benefits.  
In order to understand the effects of cross-national welfare state differences for free 
movement issues, it is of critical importance to recognise the funding and qualifying 
conditions of the different benefit systems. They are important, not only from a financial 
point of view but also in terms of ’legitimacy‘: qualifying conditions in the form of social 
security contributions represent an effective way of establishing the ’deservingness‘ of 
benefit claimants (Palme et al. 2009).  
How can this broad characterisation of variations of social insurance systems help us 
to understand why EU Member States would differ in their views on free movement ? 
Following the principle of reciprocity, countries with social protection systems where there is 
a clear link between contributions and benefits, i.e. a high degree of earnings-relatedness, are 
less likely to oppose access to rights of mobile workers. The fact that EU-regulations follow 
the same institutional logic as the contributory earnings-related systems can be expected to 
reinforce this reciprocity effect (cf. Thornton et al. 2012). It follows that countries with low 
social insurance benefits and hence strong reliance on means-tested benefits are less likely to 
support equal rights for mobile workers: benefit claimants are expected to be seen as less 





Family policies  
Variations in the organisation of family related benefits across EU member states can also 
contribute to variable degrees of tension between EU-level regulations of benefits for migrant 
workers and national welfare states. To understand that, we need to consider the underlying 
differences and goals behind the major family policy models (Korpi 2000). Where countries 
have very modest family-related benefits, families with children have to rely on market 
income for their subsistence and can hence be said to apply a market based model (common 
in Anglo-American countries). Other countries have much more ambitious family policies – 
but with different goals and using different policy instruments.  
Traditional family policy tends to be based on programs that provide support to 
families with children in ways that facilitate a gendered division of market and care work 
between the spouses. This approach is commonly labelled the male-breadwinner model of 
family policy (common in continental Europe). There is an important link in this model 
between the funding strategy of paying social security contributions and the right for the 
family members to derive rights from the fact that the worker/breadwinner pays such 
contributions.  
This is a very different logic from the dual-earner model (common in the Nordic 
countries), where family benefits and services are designed to provide resources and create 
incentives for both parents to work and take caring responsibilities. While there are earnings-
related contributory benefits also in this model, rights are individual and child benefits have 
historically been paid directly to mothers irrespective of their labour force attachment, which 
stands in contrast to the male-breadwinner model where the person paying the contributions 
also receives the benefit.  
The distinction between the derived rights of the male-breadwinner model and the 




politics of free movement, especially with regard to the issue of exporting benefits to family 
members (of mobile workers) residing abroad (Palme 1997). We can expect countries with a 
male-breadwinner family policy to be more in favour of the current EU-regulations because 
they follow the same institutional logic (of derived rights) and are based on a stronger link 
between contributions and benefits and thus also a stronger degree of reciprocity. Countries 
with family policies based on an institutional logic of individual rights deviate from the EU-
regulations but nevertheless have to follow them, including exporting benefits to family 
members (of mobile workers) residing in other countries. Countries with dual earner family 
policies that are based on a logic of individual rights are hence more likely to oppose equal 
rights for EU workers because some of the rights are not seen as rights for workers but for 
residents. This distinction between rights for residents and rights for workers has a long 
tradition dating back to the first laws on child benefits being paid to mothers (residents) in 
some countries and to contributors (workers) in other countries (Wennemo 1994).  
Moreover, there tends to be a strong resemblance between the social insurance and 
family support models that individual countries have implemented (Korpi 2000): the market 
oriented family policy model is prevalent in basic security countries. The dual earner model 
is generally found among the encompassing countries. The male breadwinner model is 
common among the state corporatist countries. This suggests that effects that are expected 
from the policy design in one policy area (social insurance) will be reinforced by the same 
kind of models in other policy areas (family policies).  
 
Health care 
The organisation of the provision of health care is a third dimension of social policy that can 
be expected to affect national policy responses to free movement. Comprehensive health care 




article, it is important to point out that they differ in both the underlying model of financing 
and how benefits are delivered. A basic distinction is commonly made between the health 
insurance model (typically found in Continental Europe) and the national health services 
model (in Britain and the Nordic countries) (cf. Wendt et al. 2009). The insurance model for 
health care follows the same logic as the social insurance model for cash benefits discussed 
above, i.e. insured persons pay contributions and then are insured in separate corporations. In 
contrast, universal health care systems are typically tax funded without the specific link 
between the financing mechanism and how and where you are insured found in health 
insurance systems (where contributions more clearly establish such a link). In universal 
health care systems, residents are not contributors by default, which might be a source for 
concerns about legitimacy given the wide-spread value and expectation of reciprocity.  
In relation to EU regulations around free movement, we expect countries with 
insurance based health care models to be less likely to oppose access to equal rights of 
mobile workers (and their families). This follows from the deservingness argument as well as 
the institutional logic argument. Again, since countries tend apply the same kind of models in 
different policy areas, we can expect health care models to reinforce the logics and normative 
attitudes associated with other parts of the social protection system.  
It is also important to recognise that there are likley to be interactions between social 
insurance, family policies and health insurance on the one hand, and labour market 
institutions on the other hand. For example, liberal market economies that generate more 
mobility could also generate greater costs for the public finances due to the fact that wages 
are so low that the typical low-wage worker will have entitlements to supplementary means- 
or income-tested benefits. The market-oriented family policies prevalent in these economies 
may have relatively strong effects on the politics of free movement, because equal rights for 




well as in the countries of origin. In tax funded health care systems, the spill over costs from 
a large number mobile workers and their family members may also be perceived to be a 
burden to a larger extent than in ’self-financed‘ contributory health care systems. 
 
Conclusion: National institutions vs. free movement?  
To understand the on-going disagreements between EU member states about the rules for free 
movement in the European Union, it is necessary to go beyond an analysis of actors, such as 
populist political parties and the media in different countries, and consider the role of national 
institutions in setting the stage for the domestic politics of, and policy responses to the cross-
border mobility of EU workers. We argue that it is important to ask whether and how cross-
country differences in national welfare state institutions and labour market regulations 
contribute to political conflicts between EU member states about the need to reform the 
current rules for free movement.  
The theoretical analysis of welfare state and labour market institutions has helped us 
to establish the links between key national institutions and the domestic politics of free 
movement. A core feature of our framework is that national labour markets and welfare state 
institutions can affect the development of policy positions on free movement directly, and/or 
indirectly via inter-relationships with normative attitudes and the characteristics of the 
inflows of EU workers.  
Whether and how institutions affect national policy responses to free movement is 
likely to critically depend on a range of actors. We expect institutions to impact on the 
national politics of free movement in addition to, and most likely in interaction with, various 
actors. We are not suggesting or assuming that institutions are more important than actors in 




states – but simply that institutions, especially labour market regulations and welfare state 
institutions, should be seen as an important part of the contexts that actors are conditioned by.  
The interplay between institutions and actors in the national politics of free movement 
complicates the articulation of strong expectations and hypotheses about how different labour 
markets and welfare states affect national policy positions on free movement. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to formulate some general expectations about how specific institutional variations, 
ceteris paribus, may impact on national policy preferences. As argued above, countries with 
the following types of welfare state institutions are more likely to demand restrictions on the 
social rights of mobile EU workers: social protection systems without a clear link between 
contributions and benefits, i.e. a low degree of earnings-relatedness; family policies that are 
based on individual rights; and a health care system that is based on a health care model 
funded by general taxes. These institutional variations can be expected to affect the national 
politics of free movement via a range of different factors. Our analysis places particular 
emphasis on the relative compatibility of the normative principles underlying specific welfare 
state institutions with prevailing ideas among the host country’s population about fairness 
and deservingness of welfare recipients, which are commonly characterised by welfare 
chauvinism and a preference for reciprocity as a guiding principle for providing benefits to 
new migrants. A related but broader ideational factor we emphasise is the more general 
consistency of the national welfare model with EU regulations of free movement and EU 
workers’ access to social rights (i.e. the perceived appropriateness of EU regulations given 
specific national institutions). 
We can moreover expect important interactions between the effects of welfare state 
institutions and labour market regulations on the politics of free movement. Our analysis 
suggests that countries with coordinated market economies (CMEs) where labour markets are 




there is a better control over cross-border mobility and migration flows. Nordic CMEs that 
depend on trade union activism rather than legislation – a weaker system of coordinating 
labour markets – may be more likely to demand restrictions of EU workers’ social rights. In 
liberal market economies (LMEs), where inward-mobility and immigration, especially for 
employment in low-waged jobs, are likely to be higher than in CMEs, we can expect 
particularly important interaction effects because the relatively larger number of low-waged 
mobile workers is likely to exacerbate any concerns about free movement based on particular 
welfare state institutions (e.g. those with heavy reliance on means-testing). This illustrates the 
complexities generated by multi-level governance structures. 
Our article follows Scharpf (2010) who has emphasised the importance of recognising 
and studying the potential tensions between certain types of socio-economic institutions at 
the national level and common EU legal frameworks. Scharpf’s (2010) institutional analysis 
of the EU’s overarching economic policy paradigm suggests that EU integration through 
common legal frameworks is most compatible with national level liberal market economies 
(LMEs). Our theoretical analysis concludes that, in the more specific case of free movement 
policies this expectation is likely to be reversed, at least with regard to the regulation of 
certain specific welfare policies. The reason is that the EU legal framework for free 
movement and EU workers’ access to social rights is modelled on the kinds of social 
protection systems that could be found in the six founding member states in 1957. These 
systems were typically characterised by contributory and earnings related social insurance 
including derived family benefits and health care based on an insurance model. These 
features are mirrored in the EU regulations of social protection of EU (migrant) workers. 
Tensions can be expected to arise between the EU legal framework and particular national 
welfare institutions that do not follow these principles, which is often the case in countries 
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1 David Cameron, ’Free movement within Europe needs to be less free‘, Financial Times, 
November 26, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/add36222-56be-11e3-ab12-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz30NYYrQYX (accessed 30 April 2018). 
2 David Cameron, ’EU speech‘, November 28, 2014 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
30250299 (accessed 30 April 2018). 
3 BBC, ’EU referendum: Cameron receives Danish backing for EU deal‘, February 5, 2016,  





4 Kamal Ahmed, ’Support for EU freedom of movement rules 'eroding' ‘, January 13, 2017,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-38613027 (accessed 30 April 2018). 
5 Die Presse, ‘Keine Sozialleistung für EU-Bürger‘, March 19, 2017, 
http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5186223/Keine-Sozialleistung-fuer-EUBuerger 
(accessed 30 April 2018). 
6 Der Standard, 'Regierungsklausur: ÖVP und FPÖ wollen Familienbeihilfe ins Ausland 
kürzen‘, January 4, 2018, https://derstandard.at/2000071450581/OeVP-und-FPOe-kuerzen-
Familienbeihilfe-fuer-Kinder-im-Ausland (accessed 6 February 2018).  
7In theory, if certain national institutions are contributing to political tensions at the domestic 
level, rather than calling for a reform for the common rules governing free movement, the 
national policy response could instead involve changes to these national institutions but our 
focus is on cases where national policy makers want to change EU regulations. 
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